How Atlanta’s New Mercedes-Benz Stadium Sets The Standard For Protection Against Vehicle Attacks

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Atlanta’s new $1.5 billion stadium, home to the NFL Atlanta Falcons football team and MLS Atlanta United soccer club and site of the recent NCAA national college football championship, is protecting fans, personnel and athletes from terrorists and errant drivers from using vehicles as weapons.

While the threat of terrorists planning to attack soft targets, such as stadiums increases, stadium security professionals, such as those at the new Mercedes-Benz Stadium, must look for the weak points throughout their facilities to determine where fanatics are most likely assailing.

Taking their cue from hard target attacks, they and other stadium management understand that the use of vehicles, either to carry the people that will carry out the attack or act as the bomb itself, is a very real threat.

New System, Safer Pedestrians

Installed by Tusco, using Delta Scientific perimeter protection products, the new access system includes four DSC501 barriers, five DSC720 bollards, 39 DSC2000 barriers and 59 DSC680 fixed bollards.

“We are very experienced with installing Delta equipment,” relates Brent Martina, President of Tusco. “Mercedes-Benz Stadium was very particular about their security needs and protocols and requested a customized sequence of operations for their security equipment.

While the threat of terrorists planning to attack soft targets increases, stadium security professionals must look for the weak points throughout their facilities

“Delta Scientific’s products and experienced engineers made them the obvious choice in meeting both the high quality and technical standards required to integrate with the stadium’s sophisticated security system. It was crucial to have a reliable team in place as we received a very compressed schedule to get everything complete by the first football game and, therefore, had no room for errors.”

Because of long, straight approaches to some access points, stadiums oftentimes need to deploy high performance barriers. DSC501 barriers were used at main entrances where players and VIPs, among others, enter with their cars.

Preventing Attacks Before They Happen

The DSC501 is the only K54-certified retractable vehicle barricade in the world. Set in a foundation only 18 inches deep, it will survive and operate after a 5.4-million-foot pound impact. That’s equivalent to a 65,000-pound truck hitting it at 50 mph.

Stopping the truck or car dead in its tracks, the DSC501 protects against a “second hit” risk from a second vehicle. The stadium preferred installing these barricades in a more industrial look, wanting them to be “seen.”

Five retractable DSC720 bollards were used at the pedestrian entry areas. This is Delta’s highest crash rated bollard, stopping a 15,000-pound vehicle at 50 mph. The bollard will stop and destroy much larger vehicles than those tested at very high velocities. The DSC720 is 35 inches tall and 15 inches wide. At Mercedes-Benz Stadium, the bollards feature brushed stainless-steel sleeves.

Oftentimes, the ground below the access points are filled with cables, wires, pipes and other infrastructure products. As a result, typical, below ground installed traffic bollards, barriers and barricades cannot be used because these infrastructure products are too close to the surface. The solution is to use surface-mounted and shallow foundation barricades and barriers.

They let a facility manager meet a long-standing challenge - how to easily install bollards on shallow substrates, including those that are not level or have turns

This isn’t the only stadium using Delta equipment to protect staff and attendees from vehicle harm - Levi’s Stadium in San Francisco is a well-known user

Delivery Entrances Are Weaknesses

At the same time, for some reason, delivery entrances never seem to be as secured as the main entrances to the stadium. With delivery vehicles coming and going, delivery entrances need a solution that lets delivery vehicles enter and exit but stop unauthorized vehicles from entering at all.

At the loading docks, 39 of Delta’s fastest, smallest and shallowest foundation barricades were implemented. Chosen especially for high speed applications and ease of installation, the cost effective DSC2000 barrier is K12 crash-certified with no penetration, meaning it will stop a 15,000-pound vehicle traveling 50 mph dead in its tracks. The ten-inch shallow foundation also reduces installation complexity, time, materials and corresponding costs.

Lastly, 50 DSC680 shallow foundation fixed bollards with stainless steel sleeves protect pedestrian areas. They secure any unprotected locations where vehicle bombers and errant drivers have no obstacles. Versus cement barriers such as posts and pots, many organisations prefer fixed-post bollards for several reasons.

Terrorists typically don't go where they see barricades, so placing them wherever possible attacks can happen reduces security risks dramatically

That’s because, when hit, cement posts and pots can explode, literally spreading shrapnel throughout the crowd, potentially creating numerous injuries. Shallow foundation bollards can be installed within sidewalks or on top of concrete deck truss bridges as well as conform to the inclines and turns of a locale. They also meet the 1-meter clearance regulations mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The fixed bollard, which does not go up and down, provides a significant blocking device solution that continues to challenge security directors faced with threats such as stopping a vehicle from ploughing into the stadium’s inner perimeter. They let a facility manager meet a long-standing challenge - how to easily install bollards on shallow substrates, including those that are not level or have turns.

No longer do locations, such as curves on hills, the upper levels of parking structures and other unprotected locales have to rely on unsightly ‘make-do’ solutions to stop car bombers or wayward drivers.

One Of The World's Most Secure

“Delayed by roof issues, the Mercedes-Benz Stadium challenged us with a condensed schedule to provide one of the world’s most secure vehicle access systems,” avows Martina. “I’m proud to say that our team completed the work on time and walked away from the project with another pleased client.”

This isn’t the only stadium using Delta equipment to protect staff and attendees from vehicle harm. Among many, Penn State and Purdue as well as Levi’s Stadium in San Francisco (49ers) are well-known users. Unfortunately, most procurement offices won't allow vendors to announce their purchases. This is too bad since terrorists typically won't go where they know barricades are deployed, reducing security risks dramatically.

Leading universities, including six of the Associated Press (AP) top-10 rated 2018 pre-season football schools, also stayed one step ahead of terrorists and errant drivers this year on their campuses by identifying vulnerable areas and securing them within minutes with Delta MP5000 temporary, portable barriers. These mobile deployable vehicle crash barriers carry a K8 rating (M40 ASTM rating), stopping 7.5-ton vehicles traveling 40 mph.

Terrorists typically don't go where they see barricades, so placing them wherever possible attacks can happen reduces security risks dramatically. Today, there is little excuse for a major stadium to suffer an attack which uses a vehicle to break through the perimeter. Whatever the weakness a terrorist thinks can be exploited, there is a type of bollard, barricade or barrier to stop him, yet let authorized people through.

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Author profile

Greg Hamm Vice President, Sales and Marketing, Delta Scientific Corporation

As Vice President of Sales and Market for Delta Scientific, Greg Hamm plays a major role in the company's sales, project management, application engineering and corporate strategic planning. Under Hamm's leadership, Delta Scientific is delivering record numbers of vehicle access systems to customers around the globe.

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Why Aren’t The Federal Government’s Physical Access Systems Compliant With HSPD-12?

In the wake of 9/11, the Federal Government’s secure-the-fort, big idea was to create an identity credential for all federal employees and contractors. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-12 set it all in motion. Today, we know the smartcard-based credential that arose from HSPD-12 as the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card. The PIV card is meant to give employees/contractors physical access to federal facilities and logical access to federal information systems. While using a PIV card for logical access has been largely successful and compliant with HSPD-12, implementing PIV-based, physical access control systems (PACS) has been much more difficult to conquer. As a result, HSPD-12 compliance for PACS has largely eluded the Federal Government. The noncompliance reasons are many, but there is now hope for fully achieving HSPD-12’s mandates. Interoperability With Any Agency’s PIV Beyond Passports, PIV cards represent the only other open-standards-based, multi-vendor-supported, identity credential program on the planetAll Executive Branch employees and long-term contractors, including the entire Department of Defense, have been issued PIV cards. This has been true since 2013. Beyond Passports, PIV cards represent the only other open-standards-based, multi-vendor-supported, identity credential program on the planet. It seems so simple, where employees/contractors previously used their proximity card to open a federal facility door or go through a turnstile, they should now be able to use their PIV card. However, HSPD-12 took the PIV requirement one step further – compliant PACS must be interoperable with any agency’s PIV. This introduced an entire magnitude of additional complexity. A compliant, interoperable, PIV-based PACS should work like this: an authorized employee (or contractor) presents a PIV card (contact or contactless) to a card reader to enter whichever federal agency building they have reason to be. Over the last 14 years, in all but a very few cases, the lack of PACS’ HSPD-12 compliance has prevented this from happening. Secure Credential Policy Today, less than 1% of the Federal Government’s PACS are HSPD-12-compliant. At most federal facilities, especially those outside the National Capitol Region, a noncompliant PACS works like this: an authorized employee (or contractor) presents a proximity (‘prox’) badge to a proximity card reader to enter his or her agency’s facility. At the fraction of federal facilities with upgraded PACS that work with PIV cards, virtually all such PACS fail to properly use a minimum number of PIV security features before granting access – let alone interoperate with a PIV card from any other agency. Active government solicitations are issued for new, non-compliant, proximity-based systems that perpetuate the delay to HSPD-12 complianceNew federal initiatives frequently suffer from having no policy to enforce their roll-out. That isn’t the case with PACS compliance. Policies have been in place for so long that newer policies like Office of Management and Budget (OMB) M-11-11 (February 3, 2011) remind everyone what the policies said in 2004 and 2006. This year, OMB publicized its proposed OMB M-18-XX (Draft), which will replace M-11-11. OMB M-18-XX’s (Draft) main PACS thrust is, once again, to ensure that everyone understands what the Federal Government’s secure credential policy is. It hasn’t changed since 2004. It would be tempting to say that PACS technology isn’t mature, but that isn’t the case. In 2013, the Federal Government revamped the PACS portion of the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program and, since that time, all PACS on the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Approved Products List are 100% compliant and interoperable. Yet, on any given day, active government solicitations are issued for new, non-compliant, proximity-based systems that perpetuate the delay to HSPD-12 compliance. The usual suspects, policy and technology, are not the culprits for this epic delay. An authorized employee presents a PIV card to a card reader to enter whichever federal agency building they have reason to be Difficulties In Adopting HPSP-12 Compliance For PACS Standards – The Federal Government’s approach to standards is to avoid a great deal of specificity. It’s an unspoken tenet that federal standards must be flexible, promote innovation and avoid disadvantaging any participating market segment. The opposite is true if your goal is interoperability: nearly every detail must be specified. Consider the standards-based success story of chip-based credit cards. When was the last time you used a credit card and it didn’t work? Interoperability failures are nearly unheard of. If you look at the hundreds of volumes of technical specifications that cover minute aspects of every component in credit cards and payment terminals, you quickly realize why it works so well. Nothing is left to chance, nothing is a variable, and there is no optionality. The Good News: Work to increase viability through deep scrutiny has progressed in recent years. The GSA APL PACS Testing Lab, set up in 2013, annually tests credentials from all PIV issuers against all GSA-approved PACS. This testing has significantly reduced interoperability failures at federal facilities. Collaboration – In the past, physical access practitioners from federal agencies rarely collaborated, unlike their logical access counterparts. This is also true for PACS procurement decision-makers across agencies and facilities. The Good News: In 2018, an agency trend has emerged where finally physical access, physical security and IT practitioners have begun sitting down to discuss their shared responsibilities. We have already begun to see coordinated budget requests between IT and Security with enterprise architectures positioning PACS as an enterprise service on the network Scale – The Federal Government owns so many buildings that they can’t be counted. Google doesn’t know how many there are and neither does any one government official. Variability – A significant percentage of facilities have unique aspects making a one-size-fits-all approach infeasible. The Good News: Mature consulting services can now help agencies marry federal requirements with their unique environments to develop robust PACS enterprise architectures. As we see this occurring more and more frequently, a repeatable, achievable, systems-based upgrade of all PACS may be on the horizon. The GSA APL PACS Testing Lab annually tests credentials from all PIV issuers against all GSA-approved PACS Provenance – In many cases, different groups own different parts of a single facility, not all of whom might be subject to, or wish to interoperate with, a high-assurance compliant PACS. For example, GSA manages facilities for Legislative and Judicial tenants who aren’t subject to HSPD-12. Policy dictates that GSA manage the PACS for the front doors of these facilities should be HSPD-12-compliant, despite the fact that these tenants likely don’t have credentials that work with this technology. Sure, these tenants could commercially obtain a PIV-I credential, but almost none have. Economics – It’s difficult for agencies to create their annual security budget requests when HPSD-12 PACS upgrades are in scope, because so many unknowns exist at each facility. To assess the cost, the time to complete, and the facility’s existing equipment inventory, it would be logical for an agency to hire a contractor with PACS expertise to perform a site assessment. Having to do capital planning for an assessment phase in advance of making the annual budget request for the PACS upgrade creates a never-ending cycle of delay. Especially at agencies with multi-year capital planning requirements. Many agencies, trying to avoid this delay cycle, have fallen prey to doing site assessments themselves. This results in their integrators doing their walk-throughs after the contract is awarded. This is the leading cause of PACS upgrade cost overruns. Dependence on the agency’s IT department – Historically, PACS have been deployed on dedicated networks and are rarely ever connected to the enterprise, let alone the Internet. High-assurance PACS that validate credentials from other agencies must now communicate with many different systems on an enterprise network and over the Internet – so much so that the Federal Government reclassified PACS as IT systems. The Good News: With collaboration increasing between Physical Security Officers (PSOs) and Chief Information Officer (CIOs), we expect this to improve in due course. Resistance to change – This is a classic human factors challenge, and it’s a big one. PSOs have spent decades achieving their positions. PIV-based PACS could not be more different from the technologies that proceeded it, and such radical change is often resisted. When the value proposition is clear, change is adopted more readily. But security value isn’t easily measured or observed. It is often said that the best performance review for a PSO is to note that nothing happened. And when something does happen, it is necessarily kept quiet so the risk can be remediated without calling attention to the vulnerability in the interim. To date, the value proposition of moving to PIV-based PACS has been entirely based on policy (without corresponding funding in most cases) and through the shock value of white hat hackers, showing how easily most proximity badges can be cloned. This is not the stuff of change agents. PIV-based PACS could not be more different from the technologies that proceeded it, and such radical change is often resisted Are These Challenges A Unique Situation? No, these PACS challenges are not unique. Cybersecurity initially faced many of the same challenges that federal PACS face today. By 2000, the Federal Government recognized its urgent need to improve cybersecurity practices across its computing infrastructure and issued many policies that required agencies to improve. Improvement was sparse and inconsistent. GSA Schedules were set up to help agencies buy approved products and services to assist them, but this too produced lacklustre results. The Federal Government found that the best cybersecurity results occurred when enforced at the time an agency commissioned a system Congress enacted the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) (now amended by the Federal Information Security Modernization Action of 2014). FISMA mandates an Authority To Operate (ATO) accreditation process for all information systems. The Federal Government found that the best cybersecurity results occurred when enforced at the time an agency commissioned (vs. purchased) a system. FISMA and ATO accreditation has been highly successful when implementing new systems. These cybersecurity requirements are the closest thing that the Federal Government has to the ‘PIV Police’ today. However, the PIV requirements in FISMA and ATOs currently apply to only logical access for information systems. The proposed OMB M-18-XX (Draft) mentions that a FISMA PACS overlay to NIST SP 800-53 is forthcoming. The intent of the PACS overlay is to use the army of ATO accrediting officials in the Federal Government and enable them to assess implemented PACS as fit for purpose. This is the first time an enforcement approach has been brought forward that could reasonably succeed. How Long For HSPD-12 Compliance? We know that it won’t take another 14 years to achieve HSPD-12 compliance. Pockets of compliance are popping up. Compliant procurements do exist, and the state of PACS across the Federal Government is better in 2018 than in any previous year. Progress to date has been at a constant rate. The question is: what would take for progress to occur at an exponential rate instead? A major attack or compromise involving PACS would certainly hasten upgrades, but let’s hope that’s not the solution. The energy distribution sector has been riding a wave of security upgrade demands to retrofit their facilities across the U.S. The energy distribution sector, under nearly constant Advanced Persistent Threat attacks, has been riding a wave of security upgrade demands to retrofit their facilities across the U.S. The potential threat exists for Federal Government facilities as well. Looking into the federal PACS-compliance crystal ball, we’re beginning to see the faint outline of a multi-faceted campaign of education, budgetary oversight and accreditation of PACS that will ultimately see us past the tipping point. Consider though, at the current rate of PACS enablement, a 50% compliance rate is still far in the future. When that day arrives, the PIV card form factor may no longer be the key that fits that future lock. (Are you already using a mobile device’s Bluetooth interface to open the door to your office building?) Taking decades to perform a technology upgrade is the aging elephant in the room no one talks about. By the time critical mass is achieved with an upgrade facing these many challenges, there are typically compelling reasons to start over again with the next generation of technology. That cycle may well prove to be the Federal Government’s biggest PACS challenge of all.

Preparing For Cyber-attacks: The Intersection Of Cybersecurity And Physical Security

Terry Gold of D6 Research has been giving “cyber in physical security” presentations at a variety of conferences, including ISC West and the Cyber:Secured Forum. We caught up with him for some insights about the intersection of cybersecurity and physical security. Q: Tell us a little bit about your background, specifically in the context of its relevance to cyber security in physical access. Gold: I started out in information security and then got involved in physical security along the way. I started really focusing on physical from a cyber standpoint about 10 years ago. I got into ethical hacking about 8 years ago, and then worked on putting it all together. There wasn’t a roadmap, so I had to build a methodology which I now share with other hackers, end users and law enforcement. I spend all my time either in the lab building success models, methods, and testing them out in some to the largest customers or agencies in the world for validation and improvement. Also, a chunk of my time is spent re-engineering security assessment and controls for end users or validating vendors on their behalf from a unique viewpoint that’s not (yet) typical in the industry. Q: How well prepared is physical security overall against cyber threats? Gold: Not well at all. While security is imperfect anywhere, much of the practices and designs have critical defects and overlook either best practice or fundamental application security principles. I’d say that the industry is very wide open for exploitation that doesn’t take much sophistication to execute. Breach disclosure laws are focused on mandatory reporting for personally identifiable information (PII) Q: What things stand out to you along your journey regarding the changes that you are seeing on this topic? Gold: Culture. Over the years, the industry (and most end users) have been dismissive of my findings. Industry culture hasn’t been aligned to embrace the topic and make requisite improvements that are needed to achieve “good security.” However, I’m finally starting to see that change – quickly and at scale. It doesn’t mean that we’re close to “good,” but rather reached the inflection point of change – and I’m rather pleased about it. Breach disclosure laws has resulted in IT getting a lot of media attention in comparison to hacks made against physical security Q: D6 does a lot of research in this area. What is the analysis behind the recent push for cyber security in physical security? Gold: First, it must be recognized that the threat isn’t new, but rather that the industry is only now coming to the table on it. Industry sentiment has been that breaches in physical security don’t happen or that there’s little impact. It must be recognised that the threat isn’t new, but rather that the industry is only now coming to the table on itBoth are false. Mainly, IT gets all the media attention with breaches for two reasons; 1) breach disclosure laws are focused on mandatory reporting for personally identifiable information (PII), and 2) there is really poor detection (mostly non-existent) against hacks in physical security, so they go unrecognized. On the other side, as physical security systems increasingly resemble an IT architecture, so does their risk profile. As it expands to mobile, cloud, IOT and intelligence - InfoSec and auditors are taking a look and are alarmed at what they’re seeing. Before you know it, the scrutiny is cutting pretty deep, pressure for alignment becomes intense, and vendors feel the pinch on the sales cycles. It’s not a comfortable position for anyone. Q: What will be the projected impact? Are practitioners seeing the whole picture? Gold: No, and this area is probably the most important takeaway of this interview. The industry is where InfoSec was about 15 years ago in their journey, except we have an additional headwind to deal with – culture change. This industry tends to rely more on trusted relationships than validating the recommendations are being provided. There are too many prevailing misconceptions, that unless remediated, investments won’t be as effective as expected. Q: What do you believe are the top misconceptions? Gold: Well, this is a longer topic, but here’s a sampling that cuts across different areas. Regarding hackers: A misconception is that they’re generally not interested. Hackers are increasingly very interested. When I teach a workshop at a hacker conference, it’s usually the quickest to fill up and go to wait list (within a couple hours). Regarding attacks: A misconception is that attacks are executed directly against the target system. Example, their goal is to get into VMS and attack it directly. The reality is that they’re more commonly dynamic where physical is part of a larger attack and its role is an easier gateway to another system (or vice versa, with many hops). Regarding protective measures. The most prevalent mistake that the industry is currently making is too much focus and reliance on air-gapping networks or locking ports. This is only a slice of the attack surface and there are various ways to get around it. There’s a heavy price to pay for those that that rely too much on this strategy since its often accompanied by few mechanisms to deal with actors once they do get in (and they definitely will). Regarding the value of exploiting physical security. Too often perceived as low value. In our white paper we review many of the things that hackers can do, what they gain, and how it can impact the overall organization. It’s far broader and deeper than most. Q: What are the top things that need to change in the industry? Gold: First, culture. This can be answered by adopting the same principles as InfoSec. From an execution standpoint, the industry needs to change how they perform risk assessments. At D6, we’ve developed a stepwise methodology from ground up and it’s a huge differenceIndustry practices, including certifications, are significantly outdated and don’t reflect a methodology that accurately considers cybersecurity, actors, methods, and proactive remedy. At D6, we’ve developed a stepwise methodology from ground up and it’s a huge difference. End users that don’t re-engineer their practice, will be very limited for meaningful cybersecurity improvement. One of the changes needed in the industry includes how risk assessments are performed Q: Generally, what advice do you give to clients on steps to move their cyber security to the next level? Gold: Don’t operate like a silo anymore. Transition from industry “common practices” to best practices that can be validated. Rely less on previous relationships and more toward domain competence. Collaborate with the CISO to a principled, goal-oriented and metrics-based approach. Embed an InfoSec person on the physical team. Present priorities and risks jointly to the board within an overall risk portfolio. Invite scrutiny from auditors. Get a red team performed once a year. Until you do the last step, you don’t really know where you stand (but don’t do it until the other things are done). Last, set the bar higher with vendors to support these improvements or their products will just end up being weak link. Q: What type of challenges do you see and any advice on how end user and integrators can overcome them? Lessons learned? Gold: There are too many specific domains across cybersecurity – it’s not just a network security resourceFeedback I get from integrators is that they’re struggling to figure out how to deliver expertise to their clients in their area. They’re somewhat overwhelmed with the complexity, becoming an expert or how expensive it is to hire and maintain those skilled resources. My best advice is not to do either. There are too many specific domains across cybersecurity – it’s not just a network security resource. Not even the large integrators have the right bench, and unfortunately, they’re just further down a doomed path than smaller integrators. Form a partnership with boutique cybersecurity firms that have multiple specialists. Negotiate rates, margins, scope, and call on them when needed. It won’t come out of your bottom line, the results will be better, and the risk will be extremely low. You’ll learn along the way too. Q: Anything notable that your research is uncovering in this area that might not be on people’s radar yet? Gold: Yes, quite a bit. Our Annual Industry Assessment Report goes through every segment. We’re making pretty bold statements about the future and impact, but we’re confident. One thing that stands out is how intelligence (and the swath of subsets) will impose stringent demands on physical security due to attribute and data collection (for analysis) which will absolutely require privacy compliance, integrity, and controls. It will even shape organizations that might not care about cybersecurity but are prioritizing function. Q: Where can readers learn more about your perspectives on this topic? Gold: Blogs on the D6research.com website. Our annual report. Val Thomas of Securicon and D6 have collaborated on a three-part cybersecurity in physical white paper series. It goes into all of this in detail, as well as remedy.

Is The Physical Security Industry Doing Enough To Prevent School Shootings?

School shootings continue, as does a search for answers. What solutions are there to prevent school shootings and/or to improve the response (and thus minimize the death toll)? In the physical security industry, we like to think we have solutions that can help, if not “solve”, the problem, but realistically speaking, how effective are they at the end of the day? We like to think we have solutions that can help, if not “solve”, the problem: but how effective are they at the end of the day? The sad answer – even after dozens of school shootings and even in the wrenching aftermath of the latest one – is that we don’t know. There is a gaping lack of knowledge and research when it comes to measuring the effectiveness of preventative measures as they relate to school shootings. Scarce Resources For Preventative Measures The dearth of knowledge on the subject leaves schools at risk of spending scarce resources on measures that don’t have any real impact, or worse, that have a negative effect on education environments. The natural impulse following a school shooting is to do something – anything – to prevent the tragedy from happening again at any school, but especially at my school. But how is money best spent?Successful businesses are a good thing, but not at the expense of misspending education resources on solutions that don’t solve anything Congress has passed the Stop School Violence Act of 2018 to provide $50 million per year to develop programs to train students, teachers and law enforcement to prevent violence, and to create anonymous reporting systems, such as hot lines, for school violence threats. The bill authorizes another $25 million for improvements to school’s physical security infrastructures. Congress also provides $1.1 billion in Title IV block grants, which districts can use to pay for diverse needs such as security systems. Several states are providing additional funding for physical safety measures and campus police, and local districts are also stretching their budgets to address security concerns. But is that money being targeted to measures that will help the situation? What is the role of technology in preventing school violence, and are we as an industry at risk of over-selling our preventative capabilities and diverting money from other measures that might have more impact? Successful businesses are a good thing, but not at the expense of misspending education resources on solutions that don’t solve anything. More metal detectors, armed guards and police officers could cause anxiety in some students and even interfere with the learning process Studies On School Safety And Protection Researchers, advocates and educators gathered this fall at American University to consider the need for better research to inform decision-making on safety, reported Education Week.The field is in desperate need of more evidence on what works, and schools want this information presented to them" A 2016 study by the Rand Corp. points to the problem: Lack of data and research on what works and what doesn’t. “Despite growth in the school safety-technology sector, rigorous research about the effectiveness of these technologies is virtually non-existent,” according to Rand. “The field is in desperate need of more evidence on what works, and schools want this information presented to them in vetted, digestible ways to help them with procurement.” Jeremy Finn, a professor of education at the University of Buffalo, has pointed out the difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of measures designed to deter events that likely won’t occur anyway. “How do you know when you have deterred a school shooting?” he asks. “It didn’t happen.” The Effects On Our Students Might technologies aimed at making schools more secure have an adverse effect on the learning environment? More metal detectors, armed guards and police officers could cause anxiety in some students and even interfere with the learning process. The physical security industry should freely acknowledge that the technologies we offer are only part of the solution to school violence Do security measures aimed at preventing active shooting incidents absorb resources that might better be used to address a more general and/or likely security threat such as vandalism or student discipline? Theoretically, security measures in general should help to prevent the probability of an active shooter at the same time they are addressing a wider range of concerns and threats. But do they? At the very least, we in the physical security market should be aware, and should freely acknowledge, that the technologies we offer are only part of the solution to school violence. Schools should take the broadest possible approach to the range of security challenges, and technology should be one tool among many. Furthermore, better data to measure what works is sorely needed to illuminate the best path forward.